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INTRODUCTION

The "pursuit of the American dream" has been replaced by the
"search for instant gratification" as the consumer's creed. More
than ever, consumers are immediately purchasing coveted goods on
installment credit' rather than waiting until the amount of the purchase price can be saved. 2 In 1989, the American Bankers Association reported that "[t]he personal savings rate, according to Federal
Reserve statistics, declined from about seven percent of disposable
income in the early 1980s to 4.2 percent in 1988."1 In the first
quarter of 1989, the amount of the outstanding balance of consumer
installment credit was a staggering $691.1 billion. 4
It is the rare dealer in consumer goods or the rare provider of
consumer services5 who has cash capital sufficient to await a customer's promised payments but yet satisfy timely the expenses of
the business. 6 The necessary conclusion is "[t] h e services of financing
institutions in buying such paper (i.e., the document evidencing the
consumer's promise to pay) or lending funds against it are, therefore, essential to the business of instal[1]ment selling. ' 7
1. "Instalgjment credit, used by consumers to purchase goods and services and to refinance
existing debt, consists of short-term and intermediate-term loans scheduled to be repaid in multiple
(i.e., two or more) installlments." AMERcAN BANKERS ASS'N, INSTALLMENT CREDiT Rr, oRT 3 (1989).
2. Goods commonly sold on an instal[l]ment payment basis include automobiles, trucks,
aircraft, boats, frozen foods, house trailers, household appliances, furniture and household
furnishings, radios, stereos, television sets... as well as... jewelry, and clothing. Services
sold on an instalg]ment payment basis include medical, dental, hospital, burial, automobile
repair, home improvement and modernization, travel, educational, and vocational training.
AMERicAN INsTrruTE oF BANKiNo, INSTALMENT CRaDrr 63-64 (1964).
3. AMERIcAN BANKERS Ass'N, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Id. This figure includes installment loans made directly to consumers by lenders as well as
installment sales made to consumers by dealers. Installment sales are defined as "the immediate use
of goods or services in exchange for a promise to pay a definite sum in a specified manner in the
future." AmERcAN INsTrruTE OF BAtNuNo, supra note 2, at 60. The promise to pay is typically "in
the form of a security agreement, retail installment contract, lien contract, or note." Id.
5. Any reference in this Article to a "dealer" shall be deemed, unless otherwise indicated, to
mean and include a "dealer in consumer goods" and a "provider of consumer services."
6. A dealer promoting instal[liment selling receives conditional sale contracts or security
agreements in lieu of cash for a substantial portion of his total sales, and these contracts
or agreements are payable over extended terms. As a result, the dealer has considerable
working capital tied up if he is unable to convert these documents into cash.
AMERICAN INsTrruTE OF BANKiNG, supra note 2, at 61. In fact, for many dealers, the suppliers of
the dealers' inventory will hold obligations of the dealers that are immediately due when the inventory

is sold.
7. Id. The reference to financing institutions includes "commercial banks, finance companies,
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The triangle of the consumer, the dealer, and the lender, which

results in most instances from an installment credit transaction, provides the framework for this Article. Consumers are only vaguely

aware that, after purchasing goods or services on credit, the payments are frequently made to a financial institution. Instead, the
consumer views the transaction as solely between him or her and
the dealer. Conversely, the lender typically views the purchase of
the consumer's installment sales contract as no different than a direct
loan to the consumer for the result is the same: the consumer buys
the product, the dealer is paid for the product, and the lender holds
a credit obligation of the consumer. In fact, the lender's activity in

purchasing installment sales contracts from dealers has been described, generally, as "indirect lending."
When the dealer of the goods ceases to do business or is oth-

erwise insolvent and, as a result, breaks a promise or warranty to
the consumer or is found to have materially misrepresented the goods

or services to the consumer, the differing perceptions of the consumer and the lender give rise to conflict. The consumer perceives
no independent promise to pay the lender and essentially "visits the

sins" of the dealer upon the lender. The lender perceives a promise
of the customer to pay which is no different than any other loan
obligation held by the lender and, accordingly, the lender expects

payment from the consumer notwithstanding the sins of the dealer.
These days of economic uneasiness coupled with the enormous

credit unions, and savings institutions." Aimac~a BANKERs Ass'N, supra note 1, at 4-5. Installment
credit obtained its legitimacy when commercial banks engaged in the business of install]ment credit.
Significantly, "[a]t first the [commercial] banks were reluctant to enter the instalment credit field."
AmmucAN INSTrTuTE OF BANuiNO, supra note 2, at 10. But:
the period following World War II the commercial banks really became interested in
[i]n
developing the business of instalgl]ment lending, which had begun to expand in volume as
the country returned to a peace-time economy. The pent-up demand for consumer durable
goods and the growing demand for goods and services could not have been met without
the added facilities of banks.
Id. at 18.
Significantly, commercial banks held, at the end of 1988, 48.4% of the outstanding consumer installment debt. AimEicAN BANKERs Ass'N, supra note 1, at 4. With respect to buying consumer
obligations from dealers, "[a]bout seven in ten community banks, more than nine in ten mid-sized
" Id. at 11.
banks, and almost all large banks offered indirect instal[l]ment loans ...
The various financial institutions who hold installment debt of consumers shall be generally
referred to in this Article as "lenders."
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amount of consumer debt makes timely the issue of who, between
the consumer and the lender, bears the loss when the dealer ceases
to do business and a problem arises out of the underlying sales
transaction.
In 1974, the West Virginia legislature enacted the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act. 8 Section 2-102 of the West
Virginia Act9 addressed the conflict between the consumer and the
lender by focusing on the assignment of consumer credit obligations
generally and by revitalizing the common-law principles governing
the assignment of obligations. Unfortunately, the Assignee Provision
has been perceived, at times, as imposing joint and several liability
between the dealer and the lender for the damages suffered by the
consumer in the consumer's transaction with the dealer. In effect,
the lender becomes an insurer for all loss suffered by the consumer
in the transaction. A review of the Assignee Provision establishes
that such a perception of the Provision is unfounded.
Moreover, the Assignee Provision was enacted before "lender
liability" became a catch phrase of 1980s' jurisprudence. An understanding of the policy advanced by the statutory provision underscores the potential friction between the policy and certain theories
advancing a lender's liability for the acts of a third party. Accordingly, the Assignee Provision should be amended so that the enhancement of its policy is not the entrapment of a lender under
other theories of a lender's liability.
This Article undertakes the review of the Assignee Provision, the
development of the policy which it serves, and the advocacy for its
amendment.
II.

THE CONSUMER TRANSACTION IN A NUTSHELL' 0

In the early 1900s, the mass production of automobiles was hindered because few people, understandably, were able to pay cash
8. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-101 (1986 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter the West Virginia
Act].
9. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102 (Supp. 1991) [hereinafter the Assignee Provision].
10. A consumer can apply directly to a lender, of course, for a loan and can use the proceeds
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for such a highly priced product. 1 In 1919, the General Motors
Corporation formed the General Motors Acceptance Corporation to
facilitate the sale of its product by dealers situated throughout the
United States.1 2 The Acceptance Corporation accomplished this mission by (i) indirectly financing the consumer's purchase of an automobile by willingly accepting an assignment from the dealer of
the purchaser's credit obligation arising from, at that time, an innovative finance plan; and (ii) directly financing the dealer's purchase of inventory from the automobile manufacturer. 3
Beginning in the 1930s, commercial banks were lured into the
field of "indirect lending" by the insurance issued through the Federal Housing Administration, which covered losses on consumer credit
obligations relating to home improvement transactions. 4 The clarity
of hindsight affirms that:
[t]he satisfactory experience gained by the banks in this area provided the impetus
to explore other fields of instal[l]ment credit. It was the majority view that since
instal[l]ment loans for property repairs and improvements could be made safely,
instai[lment loans could also be satisfactorily made for other worthy purposes."

Today, almost all commercial banks purchase installment sales contracts from dealers of consumer goods.
The process of taking assignment of consumer credit obligations
or, rather, the business of "indirect lending" is fairly standardized.
Before the consumer has actually visited the dealer's business premises, the dealer will have negotiated the sale of its installment sales
contracts with a lender or, possibly, several lenders. The terms of,
and conditions to, the sale of contracts will have been set forth in
a written document generally referred to as a dealer agreement. Additionally, the dealer agreement will have set forth the dealer's genof the loan to pay cash for a dealer's product. In this situation, no triangle exists; instead, the
transaction is, essentially, a straight line between two entities, ie., the consumer and the dealer.
Accordingly, the lender is effectively isolated from the transaction and can demand, therefore, payment
from the consumer without regard to the underlying transaction. However, this general rule is fraught
with significant exceptions. See infra note 102.
11. AAmmcAN INSTrruTE oF BAtmsa, supra note 2, at 5.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
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eral warranties to the lender covering the underlying consumer
transactions, especially warranties with respect to (i) the compliance
of the transactions with state and federal law or regulations, and
(ii) the enforceability of the obligations against the consumers under
state and federal law or regulations.
After execution of the dealer agreement, the dealer will submit
to the lender or lenders a credit application of its customer which,
in these days of facsimile transmissions, will be done in the "real
time" of the transaction. 16 The dealer will provide to the lender or
lenders the basic terms of the proposed transaction including the
cash price, the down payment, and the interest rate. 17 A lender will
either approve the purchase of the contract or refuse the purchase
of the contract, depending upon the perceived strength of the customer's credit. 18 If the purchase of the contract is approved, then
the lender will impose conditions which must be satisfied before the
transaction between the dealer and the lender is consummated. Standard conditions might be that the installment sales contract be in
a form approved by the lender, 19 the security, if any, for the credit
obligation be properly documented and perfected, 2° and the insurance for the collateral, if any, be issued.
Upon the lender's conditional approval, the dealer and its customer will execute the final form of the installment sales contract.
16. The dealer may submit the proposal to more than two or three lenders. The dealer may

be shopping for the best terms or may be shopping, simply, for the fastest response.
17. The interest rate is generally left to negotiation between the dealer and the customer, except
the lender may establish a minimum interest rate for any contract as a condition to its purchase.

18. The purchase of an installment sales contract can be done (i) on a recourse basis, which
means that the risk of the credit unworthiness of the customer remains with the dealer who will be
obligated to repurchase the contract if the customer defaults for reason of inability to pay; or (ii)
on a nonrecourse basis which means that the risk of the credit unworthiness of the customer is
shouldered by the lender upon the purchase of the contract. It should be noted that the recourse or

nonrecourse provisions of the dealer agreement are separate and discrete from any warranties of the
dealer regarding the general enforceability of the customer's obligation. Accordingly, if the obligation
is unenforceable because the dealer misrepresented the product, the lender can require the dealer to
honor its warranty of enforceability even if the assignment of the contract is "without recourse."
19. The requirement that the dealer use a form approved by, or even prepared by, the lender
ensures that the various requirements of state and federal law regarding consumer credit documentation
and disclosures have been satisfied. Otherwise, lenders would require legal counsel to review each
form submitted to them for compliance which would increase, unnecessarily, the costs of such trans-

actions that would be transferred by the lender to the dealer and by the dealer to the consumer in
the form of higher prices.
20. See generally W. VA. CODE § 46-9-101 to -507 (1966 & Supp. 1991).
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Significantly, the customer's promise to pay in installments is given
directly to, and in favor of, the dealer. The dealer is obligated to

provide to the customer all the necessary disclosures required by
state and federal law or regulations. With the execution of the installment sales contract, the consumer will take possession of the
product and the dealer will retain the installment sales contract and
any cash down payment.
If the conditions to the lender's purchase of the contract have
been satisfied and all periods for the consumer's rescission of the
transaction have expired, the dealer will then actually sell its rights
to, and interest in, the contract to the lender. The sale of the contract

will be made effective by language "assigning" the installment sales

21
contract and any accompanying documents.

The consideration paid by the lender for the assigned contract
will vary depending upon the strength of the competition from other
lenders. 22 The consideration paid by the lender might be (i) the prin-

cipal balance of the contract with the lender's return solely dependent upon the collection of interest on the obligation,2 (ii) the
principal balance of the contract discounted by an amount to additionally compensate the lender if the interest rate on the obligation
21. Transfers of rights to payment are made either through negotiation, if it is a negotiable
instrument, or assignment, if it is not. As one treatise summarizes:
The word assignment is sufficiently comprehensive to include the transfers of all kinds of
property and property rights and is sometimes used synonymously with "grant" so as to
operate as a conveyance of the title to real property, but ordinarily it is limited in its
application to the transfer of intangible rights, including contractual rights, choses in actions,
and rights in or connected with property as distinguished from the property itself. It may
be observed that while every assignment is a transfer, not every transfer is an assignment.
6 Ams. Jun. 2D Assignments § 1 (1963). The premise that assignment is different from negotiation is
found in the provisions of W. VA. CODE § 46-3-202(1) (1966) which define "negotiation" as the
"transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is
payable to order, it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it
is negotiated by delivery." The Code then declares that "words of assignment. . accompanying an
indorsement do not affect its character as an indorsement." W. VA. CODE § 46-3-202(4) (1966). The
issue is academic because, as will be discussed, negotiable instruments are not favored in consumer
transactions, if they can even exist under the governing provisions.
22. In many dealer agreements, the lender will hold back for a reserve, a percentage of the
consideration as security for the dealer's performance of its various obligations to the lender under
the dealer agreement including, but not limited to, any recourse obligations.
23. The prepayment of the obligation may result in the lender having no, or only marginal,
profit in the transaction.
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is insufficient, 24 and (iii) the principal balance of the contract plus
a percentage of the interest anticipated to be collected on the contract - an arrangement common in automobile dealer agreements. 2
Upon receipt of the installment sales contract and the payment
of the consideration for the contract, the lender will notify the consumer of the assignment to the lender of the dealer's rights to the
payments under the contract, and the lender will further inform the
consumer that payments should be made to the lender directly as
the assignee. The consumer will receive, in most instances, a payment
booklet or a set of coupons from the lender to facilitate the consumer's payment to the lender.
The analogue underlying the reference to the lender's purchase
of an installment sales contract as "indirect lending" is readily apparent. The procedures followed by the lender in making a direct
loan is identical to the procedures followed by the lender in purchasing a consumer's credit obligation. In both instances, the consumer's credit rating will be investigated, and, in both instances, the
proceeds will be paid directly to the dealer. From all appearances,
the end result in taking an assignment of a consumer's installment
sales contract from a dealer is identical to the end result in making
a direct loan to the consumer for purchase of the dealer's product:
(i) the consumer has use and possession of a product for which he
or she could not, or desired not to, pay cash, (ii) the dealer has
been paid for its product so that the expenses of business might be
paid, and (iii) the lender holds a credit obligation of the consumer.
However, as will be discussed below, appearances are deceiving due
to the force and effect of the Assignee Provision.
III.

THE LAW GOVERNING ASSIGNMENTS OF CREDIT OBLIGATIONS

The compelling issue with respect to the relationship among the
dealer, consumer, and lender is who bears the risk of the loss oc24. A particularly astute consumer may negotiate the rate with the dealer who, to make the
transaction attractive to the lender, will have to discount the principal balance of the contract so the
lender can realize the desired return.
25. The amount paid by the lender as a percentage of the interest to be collected on the contract
is a premium for the sale of the contract to the lender made necessary by the intense competition
for the particular type of contract. The premium may be required to be rebated, in whole or in part,
if the consumer pays the obligation earlier than the stated maturity date in the installment sales
contract, depriving the lender of the anticipated interest income.
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casioned by the dealer's insolvency or cessation of a business and
the dealer's resulting inability to honor a warranty or other promise
to the consumer or, even more compellingly, the loss occasioned by
the dealer's material misrepresentation of the product to the consumer. As with most loans, the lender expects repayment notwithstanding the consumer's dissatisfaction with the product purchased
with the lender's financial assistance. The consumer, however, cannot differentiate between the dealer's promises to him or her and
his or her promise to pay. This is understandable for, after all, the
promise to pay was made on the dealer's premises, not in the lender's
lobby.
The development of the law resolving this issue and generally
governing the assignment of consumer credit obligations can hardly
be described as an evolution. The reason is that the present solution
to this issue, as set forth in the Assignee Provision, is, for almost
all purposes, a return to our country's common-law roots. Thus,
after the passage of a substantial period of time, the triangle of the
consumer, the dealer, and the lender has come full circle.
A.

The Common-Law Rule

As late as 1946, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
confirmed its adherence to the common-law principle that "[tihe
assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor and takes the assignment
subject to all prior equities between previous parties. His situation
is no better than that of the assignor. ' 26 Essentially, the assignee
was the assignor, but only for the purpose of the enforcement of
the obligation. With respect to the claims held by the obligated party
against the assignor, the assignee had no personal liability or, rather,
the assigned asset was the only asset of the assignee which was subject to any claim of the obligated party. As the court clarified,
"normally the assignee takes subject to all the defenses and all the
equities which could have been set up against the property in the
hands of the assignor at the time of the assignment.''27 Essentially,
26. Cook v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc., 39 S.E.2d 321, 326 (WV.Va. 1946) [hereinafter, at
times, the common-law principle will be referred to as the Common-Law Rule].

27. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
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the issue between the assignee and the obligated party who held
claims against the assignor was entirely focused on the rights which
were assigned and the general enforceability of the rights by the
assignee. 28
Moreover, the practical limitation on the manner in which the
claims of the obligated party arising out of the underlying transaction could be asserted against the assignee further insulated the
assignee from any personal liability: "[tjhus, as against the assignee,
the obligor can only assert a claim defensively when the assignee
seeks to enforce the obligation; he has no common law right to sue
the assignee affirmatively on a claim against the assignor arising
from the underlying obligation." 29 Essentially, the assignee at common law assumed the risk that the assigned obligation would be
unenforceable due to the actions of the assignor as an original party
to the transaction. However, the risk was merely related to the enforcement of the assigned obligation and did not mean, in any way,
that the assignee was required to indemnify or otherwise insure the
obligated party from damages suffered in the underlying transaction.
This is particularly relevant to the discussion of the common day,
rather than common law, assignee's liability under the Assignee Provision because, as previously stated, the Assignee Provision has been
perceived as creating a joint liability between the assignor and assignee for all damages sustained by the obligated party in the underlying transaction.
B.

The Holder in Due Course Doctrine
The potential problems with enforcement of an obligation by an
assignee made the assignment of such obligations a difficult task.
28. The absence of any general liability by the assignee is emphasized by the following corollary
to the Common-Law Rule: "However, absent an agreement to the contrary, the common law assignee

takes only the benefits, not the burdens of the assigned obligation." Rosemond v. Campbell, 343
S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C. 1986). The assignee merely takes the right of payment subject to the other
terms included in the writing, if any, evidencing the right to payment. The responsibility of honoring
promises not embodied in the assigned writing remains with the assignor. Accordingly, while the failure
to perform the promises may give rise to a defense to the enforcement of the obligation, it does not
give rise to a claim that the assignee should have performed, or is liable for the nonperformance of,
the nondelegated promises.
29. Id. at 645. For the reasons set forth in the text, the term "assignee liability" is somewhat
of a misnomer, but it is certainly a more convenient reference than "the rule of restrictive enforcement
of assigned obligations."
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In England, Lord Mansfield deemed it vital that the Bank of England's bearer notes be equivalent to cash. 0 Opining that the goodfaith purchaser of the bearer notes was not subject to any claims
or defenses of the original parties to the note, Lord Mansfield promoted the free circulation of such notes, but, most significantly,
planted the seed that blossomed into the holder in due course doctrine. "
Significantly, the holder in due course doctrine was given the
imprimatur of West Virginia's lawmakers with the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 32 Section 302(1) of Article 3 of the Uni33
form Commercial Code defines a holder in due course as a holder
who takes a negotiable "instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good
faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." 3 4 With such lofty status, the holder of the instrument takes
"the instrument free from ... all claims to it on the part of any
person ... and all defenses of any party to the instrument with
'35
whom the holder has not dealt.
Accordingly, lenders could purchase obligations evidenced by negotiable instruments and hold the obligations free from the claims
or defenses which the obligated party held against the party with
whom the obligated party had dealt in the underlying transaction.
The doctrine protected the general negotiability of documents in the

30. William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-DueCourse Doctrine on the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U. L. REa. 325,
327 (1984) (citing Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758)).
31. Id.
32. W. VA. CODE §§ 46-1-101 to -10-104 (1966).
33. "'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument
or a certificated investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer
or in blank." W. VA. CODE § 46-1-201(20) (Supp. 1991).
34. W. VA. CODE § 46-3-302(l) (1966).
35. W. VA. CODE § 46-3-305 (1966); see Rosemond v. Campbell, 343 S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C.
1986) (citations omitted), in which the court explained:
[A] person taking a negotiable instrument as a "holder in due course" takes it free from
all claims to it on the part of any person and free from all "personal" defenses of any
party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt. Personal defenses include the
defenses of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration.
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flow of commerce, but, admittedly, fostered potentially harsh results.316
C.

The Waiver of Claims and Defenses Clause

The holder in due course protection was only available for instruments which were negotiable. 37 Negotiability required that the
writing contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer." 38s The combining of promises to pay
with other standard terms of a loan agreement made the negotiability
of loan instruments uncertain.
In response to the possible unavailability of the holder in due
course protective status, lenders and other assignees began requiring
a written waiver of the obligated party's claims and defenses to be
set forth in the provisions of any contract to be purchased. Again,
the inclusion of such a waiver in a contract received the imprimatur
of the West Virginia Legislature with the enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code.39 Section 206 of Article 9 of the Code provides:
36. The following example was set forth in Lorin G. Tobler, Comment, Consumer Protection Under the UCCC and the NCA - A Comparison and Recommendations, 12 ARuz. L. Ray.
572, 586-87 (1970):
Suppose Mr. Doe, a consumer, makes a credit purchase of a stove from a local appliance
dealer. When he makes the purchase, Doe signs a negotiable note which the dealer later
sells to a finance company which takes as an HDC [i.e., Holder in Due Course]. The night
after selling the note this particular dealer leaves town without delivering the stove. At this
point Doe refuses to pay because he feels he should not have to pay for something he did
not receive. In the creditor's suit to collect the note, the primary question is the allocation
of loss between the innocent consumer and the innocent creditor. On one hand, the court
desires to protect the consumer from the seller's abusive practices and, on the other hand,
to preserve the free negotiability of commercial paper. Under the present status of the law,
failure of consideration is not a defense against an HDC and Doe would have to pay the
finance Company the amount of the note even though he did not receive the stove.
Many courts, however, were entertaining creative theories to circumvent the effect of the holder in
due course doctrine such as extending to its limits the requirement of good faith in accepting an
instrument or imposing the requirement that no close connection exist between the holder and the
seller. Id.; see generally Daniel F. Hedges, Note, The Holder-in-Due-CourseDefense in Consumer
Sales, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 240 (1971). However, the various defenses were generally ineffective against
holders of the instrument after the first assignment. See generally Tobler, supra.
37. The holder in due course was a holder of an "instrument." W. VA. CODE § 46-3-302 (1966).
"'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument." W. VA. CODE § 46-3-102(l)(e) (1966).
38. W. VA. CODE § 46-3-104 (1966).

39. See W. VA. CODE §§ 46-1-101 to -10-104 (1966).
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[A]n agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee
any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable
by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted
against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument .... 40

Accordingly, consumers were required, effectively, to honor their
obligations to the lenders as a result of their own express agreement
to do so notwithstanding the fact that they may have held claims
or defenses which might have been asserted in defense of the obligation if still held by the original dealer in the goods. 1
D.

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code

In 1968, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), after four
years of study and drafting by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was presented for consideration

by the legislatures of the fifty states. 42 The UCCC was not passed
due to any perception of pervasive evil in society, but, instead, arose
naturally out of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-

40. W. VA. CODE § 46-9-206 (1966). The provision is "[s]ubject to any statute or decision which
establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." Id. Before enactment of the
Assignee Provision, however, no such statute or decision existed.
The effect of the inclusion of the waiver in a contract was to place the nonnegotiable m;riting
on equal footing with the negotiable instrument. See Rosemond v. Campbell, 343 S.E.2d 641, 645
(S.C. 1986).
41. Although rhetoric to that effect exists, and although undoubtedly some unscrupulous activities occurred under the guise of the holder in due course doctrine and the waiver of claims and
defenses clause, the real effect of such provisions was not to rob consumers of their very last penny,
but, instead, was to merely equate the transaction in which a lender takes the assignment of consumer
obligations with the transaction in which the consumer borrows directly from the lender. Again, the
lender in the latter instance would hold an obligation of the borrower untainted, typically, by the
underlying transaction.
42. Paul R. Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach - UCCC or the NCA?,
2 URB. L.R. 439, 440 (1970). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code shall be referred to hereinafter
as the "UCCC." Mr. Moo was a member of the advisory committee which assisted in the drafting
and revising of the UCCC. U.C.C.C. prefatory note (1974). With presumably some modesty, he
described the participants in the drafting process as "composed of outstanding lawyers, judges and
law professors from each State appointed by the respective Governors thereof." Id. He further notes
that:
The UCCC hatd] been endorsed or approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association, by the former Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs,
Betty Furness, by former President Johnson's Committee on Consumers Interests and by
its Director for Legislative Affairs who participated as an observer throughout much of
the drafting work.
Id. at 441. The UCCC was revised in 1974.
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form State Laws' consideration and drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code. 43 Principally, the UCCC was "designed to supplant
the existing hodgepodge of State statutes which presently control the
extension and collection of credit to the consumer and to regulate
many kinds of consumer credit transactions not within the scope of
existing statutes" ' 44 Interestingly, the "most controversial" problem
faced by the drafters of the UCCC was "unquestionably" the
''proper legal approach to the sensitive problem of the so-called
holder-in-due-course situation. ' 45 The Conference was confronted
with the choice of "provid[ing] that no transfer or negotiation by
the seller of the buyer's contract can cutoff or defeat the buyer's
defenses or claims against the seller" 46 and possibly adversely "impact[ing] and effect[ing] ...

small business, which to successfully

compete for sales must be able to offer credit accommodations to
its customers ... [which] can be done only if some financial institution is willing to buy the seller's credit contracts. ' 47 In Solomonic, if not political, fashion, the Conference provided both
alternatives between which the states could elect.
The Alternative A proffered by the UCCC was the most restrictive, providing:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, an assignee of the rights of the seller
or lessor is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee against the
seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwithstanding an agreement to
the contrary, but the assignee's liability under this section may not exceed the
amount owing to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted against
the assignee. Rights of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted
as a matter of defense to or set-off against a claim by the assignee."

43. Id.
44. Id. at 442.
45. Id. at 449.
46. Id. at 450.
47. Id.
48. U.C.C.C. § 2.404 (1974) [hereinafter the UCCC Rule]. Under the UCCC's Alternative B
for the section, "a buyer's defenses can only be cut off if the seller transfers his buyer's obligations
to a financial institution (1) not related to the seller, (2) which acquires the contract in good faith
and for value, and (3) which gives the buyer a conspicuous notice that he must notify the assignee
of the contract within ninety days of any claims or defenses the buyer then has against the seller."
Moo, supra note 42, at 450. Obviously, this alternative is very restrictive and substantially limits, if
not eliminates, the claims or defenses which a buyer of goods or services may assert against the
assignee of his or her credit obligation.
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The UCCC Rule mirrors, precisely, the Common-Law Rule in that
it prohibits an affirmative action for relief against the assignee and
limits any claim or defense asserted against the assignee to the amount
owed on the assigned obligation. Restated, the UCCC Rule, like the
Common-Law Rule, focuses solely on the enforceability of the obligation and does not make the assignee personally liable for the
damages suffered by the obligated party in the transaction underlying the assigned obligation.
E. The National Consumer Act
Notwithstanding the UCCC's endorsement by "recognized authorities with an admitted bias in favor of the consumer," the arrival
of the UCCC was not cheered by all consumer activists. 49 Within
a short period of time after the final version of the UCCC was
presented, a "First Final Draft" of a National Consumer Act (NCA)
was printed so it might be submitted concurrently with the UCCC
for consideration by state legislatures. Unlike the drafters of the
UCCC, the drafters of the National Consumer Act discussed the
issues of consumer credit acerbicly referring to "destroying" the
holder in due course rule and not permitting the "subterfuge" of
the waiver of defenses in contracts. 5°
For the first time, liability of the assignee was proposed to be
extended beyond the mere enforceability of the assigned obligation.
The relevant section of the NCA provided: "Notwithstanding any
term or agreement to the contrary, an assignee of the rights of the
creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer, up
to the amount of the transaction total, arising out of a consumer
credit transaction." 51 The provision does not simply affect the value
of the obligation, but provides, on its face, for the recovery of
damages from the assignee although the amount of damages is limited by the amount involved in the transaction.
But what if no amount remains to be owed on the obligation?
The Common-Law Rule and the UCCC Rule did not permit affir49. Moo, supra note 42, at 441.
50. NATIONAL CONSUmER ACT §§ 2.405-06 commentary at 49-50 (First Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter the "NCA"].
51. Id. [hereinafter the NCA Rule].
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mative actions for relief against the assignee. The NCA provision
on its face does not prohibit an affirmative action for relief, and,
moreover, does not limit the relief to the mere cancellation or setoff of the obligation. Accordingly, the consumer could pay completely the obligation to the lender. If a warranty for the product
was subsequently breached, the consumer could arguably sue the
lender for recovery of those damages even though no relationship
existed at the time between the lender and the consumer. One of
the first commentaries on the National Consumer Act noted:
Were these NCA provisions adopted, no financial institution, regardless of how
large it might be, could expose itself to any such potential liability. Knowingly

or unwittingly, the authors of the NCA, by this one provision, would prohibit
any seller of goods or services from being able to find anyone willing to purchase

his customer's obligations. Is this in the best interests of consumers?

2

The language of the proposed statute was belied, however, by
accompanying commentary which stated the following purpose for
the NCA Rule: "This section makes ineffective and unenforceable
agreements of consumers in form contracts which waive their defenses against assignees." ' 53 Possibly, the NCA Rule was intended
to implement the Common-Law Rule, but did so inartfully.
IV.

Tim WEST VIRGINIA CONSUMER CREDIT AN

PROTECTION

ACT

Responding to the nationwide clamor for a standardized consumer credit and consumer protection act, the State of West Virginia
enacted the West Virginia Act in 1974. As originally enacted, the
West Virginia Act contained eight articles: Article I Short Title,
Definitions and General Provisions; Article 2 Consumer Credit Protection; Article 3 Finance Charges and Related Provisions; Article
4 Supervised Lenders; Article 5 Civil Liability and Criminal Penalties; Article 6 General Consumer Protection; Article 7 Administration; and Article 8 Operative Date and Provisions for Transition.14
52. Moo, supra note 42, at 450.
53. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 2.405-06 commentary at 50 (First Final Draft 1970).

54. A detailed and incisive review of the provisions of the West Virginia Act is contained in
Vincent P. Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and ProtectionAct, 77 W. 'VA. L. REv. 401
(1975). In 1984, the West Virginia Act was amended with the addition of a new Article 6A which
is generally known as the Lemon Law. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-1 to -9 (1986).
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In one of the rare instances of review of the consumer credit
protection provisions of the West Virginia Act, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals described the statutory provision in this
manner: "In its present form the ...

Act is a unique compilation

of consumer protection concepts. It is a hybrid of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act and some sections from then-existing West Virginia law.""5 The Court's
characterization of the Act's hybrid nature is most evident in the
provisions of the Act permitting the consumer's assertion of claims
and defenses held by the consumer against the seller of goods or
services against any assignee of the consumer's credit obligation.
Although this had been the consumer's common-law right, the holder
in due course doctrine and the consumer's waiver of claims and
defenses in standard contractual clauses had completely negated the
vitality of the Common-Law Rule as previously discussed. The West
Virginia Act's revitalization of the consumer's common-law right is,
upon close inspection, a unique blend of the provisions of the
Common-Law Rule, the UCCC Rule, and the NCA Rule.
A.

The Holder in Due Course Provision

The first step taken by the legislature was to address the holder
in due course doctrine in the context of consumer credit obligations.
Succinct in its language, the West Virginia Act provides: "With
respect to a consumer credit sale ...

the seller ...

may not take

a negotiable instrument other than a currently dated check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer ....
-56 As previously dis-

55. Clendenin Lumber & Supply Co. v. Carpenter, 305 S.E.2d 332, 336 n.4 (W. Va. 1983).
56. W. VA. CoDE § 46A-2-101(5) (1986). A "consumer credit sale" is defined as

a sale of goods, services or an interest in land in which: (1) Credit is granted either by a
seller who regularly engages as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind or pursuant
to a seller credit card; (2) The buyer is a person other than an organization; (3) The goods,
services, or interest in land are purchased primarily for a personal, family, household or
agricultural purpose; (4) Either the debt is payable in installments or a sales finance charge

is made; and (5) With respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed does not
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.
Such a sale does not include "a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or services
pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement." W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(13) (Supp. 1991).
The West Virginia Act also applies to consumer leases. However, for convenience's sake, only
the sale of goods or services will be discussed.
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cussed, a holder of an instrument cannot qualify as a holder in due
course if he or she holds an instrument or other writing which is
57
not negotiable.
B.

The Assignee Provision

Having effectively dealt with the holder in due course doctrine,
the legislature then turned to the issue of the waiver of claims and
defenses in favor of an assignee. The Assignee Provision, entitled
"[A]ssignee subject to claims and defenses," was the legislature's
response. Interestingly, the UCCC Rule and the NCA Rule were one
paragraph in length and the Common-Law Rule was a succinct statement of law while the Assignee Provision contains over one page
58
of text and seven different subdivisions.

57. Interestingly, the UCCC prohibited a seller from taking a negotiable instrument as well.
However, the UCCC precluded the status of holder in due course only if the holder had notice that
the negotiable instrument was issued in violation of the provision. The commentary of the drafters
of the UCCC stated that: "[I]t
is possible in rare cases second or third takers may not know of an
instrument's consumer origin; in this unusual situation the policy favoring negotiability is upheld in
order not to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments generally."
U.C.C.C. § 2.403 commentary (1974). The NCA cared not whether the skies were clear over the
negotiability of instruments, declaring:
Any holder of an instrument, contract or other writing evidencing an obligation of the
consumer takes it subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer up to the amount of
the transaction total arising out of the transaction whether or not it is payable "to order"
or "to bearer."

NATIONAL CoNsumE AcT § 2.405(2) (First Final Draft 1970). West Virginia opted for cloudy skies
as well, providing: "mhe holder in due course of a negotiable instrument taken in violation of this
subsection shall ... be subject to all claims and defenses arising from that specific consumer credit
sale or consumer lease which the buyer or lessee has against the seller or lessor."
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-101(5) (1986). The effect of subjecting a holder in due course to the claims
and defenses of the consumer against the seller shall be deferred to the discussion of the Assignee
Provision.
58. Relevant portions of the text of the Assignee Provision are set forth below. The remaining
provisions will be set forth in context.
(1) an assignee of any such instrument, contract or other writing [evidencing an obligation
arising from a consumer credit sale] shall take and hold such instrument, contract or other
writing subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer ...

against the seller ...

arising

from that specific consumer credit sale ... but the total of all claims and defenses which
may be asserted against the assignee under this subsection or subsection (3) ... of this
section shall not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time of such assignment,
except (i) as to any claim or defense founded in fraud: Provided, That as to any claim or
defense founded in fraud arising on or after the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred
ninety, the total sought shall not exceed the amount of the original obligation under the
instrument, contract or other writing and (ii) for any excess charges and penalties recoverable
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The initial language of the Assignee Provision is a statement of

its scope: "The following provisions shall be applicable to instruments, contracts or other writings, other than negotiable instruments, evidencing an obligation arising from a consumer credit
sale
.... 59 Because the previously discussed section of the West

Virginia Act prohibited the use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit transactions, the Assignee Provision was obviously intended to apply to all transfers of the interests in, and rights to, a
consumer credit obligation 0
Additional introductory language dictates that the provision is

to have force and effect "[n]otwithstanding any term or agreement
to the contrary6 ' or the provisions of article two, chapter forty-six

of this code 62 or section two hundred six, article nine of said chapter
forty-six. ' 63 This language affirms that the singular purpose of the
Assignee Provision is to render ineffective any contractual waiver
under section one hundred one, article five of this chapter.
(3) A claim or defense which a buyer... may assert against an assignee of such instrument,
contract or other writing under the provisions of this section may be asserted only as a
matter of defense to or setoff against a claim by the assignee: Provided, That if a buyer
..shall have a claim or defense which could be asserted under the provisions of this
section as a matter of defense to or setoff against a claim by the assignee were such assignee
to assert such claim against the buyer .

. .,

then such buyer ...

shall have the right to

institute and maintain an action or proceeding seeking to obtain the cancellation in whole
or in part, of the indebtedness evidenced by such instrument, contract or other writing or
the release in whole or in part of any lien upon real or personal property securing the
payment thereof: Provided, however, That any claim or defense founded in fraud, lack of
failure of consideration or a violation of the provisions of this chapter as specified in section
one hundred one, article five of this chapter, may be asserted by a buyer ... at any time,
subject to the provisions of this code relating to limitation of actions.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102 (1986).
59. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102 (1986).
60. The legislature was also concerned with another mechanism whereby sellers and financial
institutions would avoid potential assignee status by having the customers go directly to the lender.
Section 2-103 of the West Virginia Act, W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-103 (Supp. 1991), governs a lender
who is a "participant" in the sales transaction or is "connected" with the sales transaction and
provides that the lender is subject to all claims and defenses of the borrower against the seller arising
from that specific sale of goods or services.
61. This is a reference to the provisions of the subject instrument, contract, or other writing
evidencing the assigned obligation.
62. This is the Article of the Uniform Commercial Code governing sales of goods generally.
The Article permits, at times, the waiver by the buyer of the goods of certain rights otherwise available
in the Article.
63. This provision expressly permitted the consumer's waiver of defenses in favor of an assignee.
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by a consumer of any defenses and claims held by the consumer
against the seller upon the assignment of the consumer credit obligation. The enactment of the Provision was for no more noble a
purpose, therefore, than simply negating the effect of standard provisions in consumer credit contracts in favor of the assignee, but in
derogation of the consumer's common-law rights.
Significantly, the Assignee Provision does not prohibit the inclusion of such waivers in the contracts evidencing a consumer obligation." Instead, the provision dictates that, notwithstanding such
a contractual provision, "an assignee of any such instrument, contract or other writing shall take and hold such instrument, contract
or other writing subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer...
against the seller . . arising from that specific consumer credit
sale ....
-6 The foregoing language is essentially identical to the
language of the UCCC and the NCA except that the provision is
more specific as to the effect of negating a waiver of claims and
defenses clause.
Each of the model acts intended to negate the effect of a waiver
of claims and defenses clause in a consumer credit contract, but did
so by stating blithely that the "assignee shall be subject to" the
claims and defenses of the consumer arising out of the consumer
credit sale. Yet, the real focus of the provisions was intended to be,
as was the Common-Law Rule, on the enforceability of the assigned
obligation rather than on any liability of the assignee. The model
acts would have been more precise to have stated that the "rights
of the assignee" shall be subject to the consumer's claims and defenses against the seller. The UCCC and the NCA both identify the
assignee, however, as the "assignee of the rights of the creditor"
which more narrowly focuses the impact of the imprecise operative
language.

64. The inclusion of such a waiver in a contract or other writing might support a claim that

the provision of the contract is unconscionable giving rise to a claim under the provisions of W. VA.
CODE § 46A-5-101 (1986) or constitutes an unfair or deceptive act giving rise to a claim under the
provisions of W. VA. CoDE § 46A-6-106 (1986); see Life Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 301 S.E.2d 169
(W. Va. 1983); Orlando v. Finance One of W. Va., Inc., 369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1988).
65. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(I) (Supp. 1991).
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The Assignee Provision does not suffer from this imprecision for
it states with no uncertainty that it is the "instrument, contract or
other writing" which shall be taken and held "subject to all claims
and defenses of the buyer." The focus is on, as it was in the
Common-Law Rule, the enforceability of the obligation held by the
assignee and not upon any personal liability of the assignee. The
precision of this wording leaves no ambiguity upon which it might
be argued that the legislature intended to transform the assignee of
a consumer credit obligation into an indemnitor or insurer of all
damages of a consumer caused by the conduct of the seller in the
underlying transaction.
1. The Parameters of the Claims and Defenses Assertable
Against An Assignee
What are the "claims and defenses" to which the assignee takes
the contract subject? The answer to this question is found in the
express limitations on assertable claims and defenses rather than in
any express definition of such claims and defenses.
The first limitation on assertable claims and defenses is found
in the clause "arising from that specific consumer credit sale." If
a seller has several business transactions with a buyer, the assignee
of any one transaction can enforce the consumer's obligation without fear that any other transaction between the seller and consumer
will result in the unenforceability of the assigned obligation.
A second limitation is found in the following section of the Assignee Provision: "[n]otwithstanding any provisions of this section,
an assignee shall not be subject to any claim or defense arising from
or growing out of personal injury or death resulting therefrom or
damage to property. ' 66 The obvious impact of this provision is that
the assignee shall not be responsible for the defect in any product
or the action of any dealer which causes injury or damage to person
or property. Because personal injury encompasses mental injury, the
assignee would not take and hold the contract subject to commonly
asserted claims for relief founded on the emotional distress of the
66. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(7) (Supp. 1991).
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consumer. Again, the assignee is not providing product liability insurance nor is the assignee providing indemnity for all damages suffered by the consumer. The focus on the assignee in the transaction
is simply on the enforceability or unenforceability of the assigned
obligation, and, therefore, only the claims or defenses which generally affect the enforceability of contractual obligations can give
rise to a claim or defense which can be asserted against the assignee.67 The foregoing provision simply makes express that which
was implicit in the Common-Law Rule, the UCCC Rule, and the
NCA Rule.
Another limitation is found in the requirement that the "claims
or defenses" be those of the "buyer." No definition of a buyer is
contained in the provisions of the West Virginia Act. However, by
common usage, the buyer would be the person to whom title to the
product was passed in the sales transaction. What if, however, a
68
cosigner, endorser, or guarantor was required in the transaction?
The Assignee Provision would not affect the enforceability of the
obligation against such persons because they are not "buyers," and
the cosigner, endorser, or guarantor would be forced to offer defenses peculiar to their status rather than defenses held by the consumer whom they are accommodating. 69
What if the assignee collects the obligation from the nonbuyer
party to the obligation? General principles of subrogation would
dictate that the nonbuyer party step into the shoes of the assignee.
The irony is that the nonbuyer party would then be subject to the
claims and defenses of the buyer against the seller. However, this
is not a disturbing result for if a nonbuyer party is involved, the
consumer should, at the behest of the nonbuyer party, carefully
67. The type of claims or defenses which relate to the enforceability of a contractual obligation
are varied in form including, but not limited, to "a change in the conditions under which the parties
contracted ... where performance has been substantially interrupted or prevented thereby," "fraud,"
"a breach of warranty," or "any material breach by the other party." 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts
§ 664 (1991).
68. The lender in reviewing the transaction might refuse the installment sales contract due solely
to the weak credit of the consumer. The contract might be resubmitted on the strength of a co-maker,
endorser, guarantor, or accommodating party.
69. In fact, a waiver of claims and defenses clause in favor of the assignee by the co-maker,
endorser, guarantor or accommodating party would seemingly be effective.
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scrutinize the transaction. While the consumer may still believe that
he or she is only dealing with the business and may not be able to
separate the assignee from the business, the nonbuyer party has a
different perception because his or her role is simply to accommodate the consumer for the credit purposes of the assignee. The
nonbuyer party has a financial stake in the consumer's decision to
purchase the subject goods or services, and the investigation of the
product and the dealer would seemingly be a necessary and prudent
step for the nonbuyer party.
A requirement that the claims and defenses be against the "seller"
provides additional limitations on the claims and defenses which may
be asserted against the assignee. The most obvious limitation is that
a "manufacturer's" warranty would not give rise to a claim and
defense that can be asserted against the assignee. This result is not
disturbing because such warranties cannot be breached by the seller
in any event.
What, however, if the seller is acting as an agent for the retailer
of another product in conjunction with the sale of the seller's product? An example would be a maintenance contract which is sold
with the product. First, if the maintenance contract is also financed
in the sale, then the obligation to pay for the maintenance contract,
a service, would certainly be held by the assignee subject to any
claims and defenses of the consumer against the seller of the maintenance contract.
But would the remaining balance of the transaction be affected?
A previously discussed requirement was that the claim or defense
arise out of that specific consumer credit sale. When the service was
sold, it was sold by the dealer, but only as agent for the warranty
company actually issuing the maintenance contract. The seller then
is the warranty company, not the dealer, and the sale is actually
the sale of the maintenance contract, not the seller's product. Accordingly, the balance of the transaction should not be affected.
But to what extent is the enforcement and collection of the consumer's obligations by the assignee affected by the consumer's claims
and defenses against the seller? The Assignee Provision provides
additional limitations on the claims and defenses assertable against
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an assignee by specifying the manner and amount of the claims and
defenses to which the assignee takes subject the contract, instrument,
or other writing evidencing the consumer's credit obligation.
The first such limitation expressly limits the manner in which
the claim or defense can be asserted. Significantly, "a claim or defense which a buyer ... may assert against an assignee of such
instrument, contract or other writing under the provisions of this
section may be asserted only as a matter of defense to or set-off
against a claim by the assignee.' 70 The practical effect of limiting,
in this fashion, the manner in which the claims or defenses may be
asserted against the assignee is to limit the relief which can be obtained by the consumer - that is, the consumer cannot seek affirmative relief from the assignee on the claims or defenses. This is
consistent with the Common-Law Rule which, as previously stated,
provided for no "right to sue the assignee affirmatively on a claim
against the assignor arising from the underlying obligation."'' 7 It is
also consistent with the UCCC Rule. Two pertinent exceptions apply
to this limitation, however.
The first exception relates to the disturbing prospect for many
consumers that, absent the right to seek affirmative relief, the consumer must simply stop paying the assignee and await suit. The
assignee may not sue, however, but may nonetheless adversely report
the credit.7 2 The drafters of the West Virginia Act were sensitive to
this potential plight of a consumer and included the following language in the Assignee Provision:
70. W. "VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(3) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
71. Rosemond v. Campbell, 343 S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C. 1986).
72. The most persuasive reason for not limiting a consumer to a wholly defensive position
is the situation referred to in Professor Guttman's testimony. A consumer may stop payment
after unsuccessfully attempting resolution of a complaint with the seller, or he may have
finally discovered that the seller has moved, gone out of business or reincorporated as a
different entity. During this period the consumer may have been making payments to the
financer in good faith, notwithstanding the prior existence of defenses against the seller.
If the consumer stops payment, he may be sued for the balance due by the third party
financer. The financer may, however, elect not to bring suit, especially if he knows that
he would be unable to implead the seller and he knows the consumer's defenses may be
meritorious. Under such circumstances the financer may elect not to sue in the hopes that
the threat of an unfavorable credit report may move the consumer to pay.
Eachen v. Scott Housing Systems, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (quoting 40 Fed.
Reg. 53527 (1975)).
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Provided, that if a buyer... shall have a claim or defense which could be asserted
under the provisions of this section as a matter of defense to or setoff against
a claim by the assignee were such assignee to assert such claim against the buyer
*.. then such buyer ... shall have the right to institute and maintain an action
or proceeding seeking to obtain the cancellation, in whole or in part, of the
indebtedness evidenced by such instrument, contract or other writing or the release, in whole or in part, of any lien upon real or personal property securing
the payment thereof .... '

Again, however, the relief of the consumer is strictly limited to that
of cancelling the amount which remains due and owing to the assignee. No affirmative relief against the assignee is permitted with
respect to the amount of the obligation already paid by the consumer.
The second exception to the prohibition against affirmative actions against the assignee is stated as follows:
Provided, however, That any claim or defense founded in fraud, lack or failure
of consideration or a violation of the provisions of this chapter as specified in
section one hundred one, article five of this chapter may be asserted by a buyer
or lessee at any time, subject to the provisions of this code relating to the lim74
itation of actions.

Accordingly, the claims or defenses founded in fraud or a lack or
failure of consideration give rise to the consumer's right to seek
affirmative relief from the assignee.
2.

Lack or Failure of Consideration

The affirmative relief sought by a consumer through assertion
of a claim or defense founded on a lack or failure of consideration
has express limits in the Assignee Provision, but has additional limits
inherent in such a claim's very nature. Obviously, the ability of a
consumer to commence an affirmative action against the assignee
based upon a lack or failure of consideration is not intended to

73. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(3) (Supp. 1991).
74. The exception for the violation of provisions of W. VA. CODE § 46A-5-101 (1986) is merely
an acknowledgment that the assignee, as a creditor, is expected not to take any actions inconsistent
with the provisions of the West Virginia Act for which section 5-101 provides civil remedies and
criminal penalties. The exception precludes the argument that the assignee cannot be sued unless it
sues the consumer even with respect to its own actions as a creditor after the assignment of the
consumer's credit obligation.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

permit the recovery of compensatory damages from the assignee,
for the lack or failure of consideration does not give rise to an action
at law, but, rather, gives rise solely to an excuse for nonperformance
of a contract and an action for rescission of the contract and for
restitution. 75 Accordingly, the claim or defense, by its very nature,
is limited by the amount involved in the transaction.
The Assignee Provision provides an express limitation, however,
by requiring that the "total of all claims or defenses which may be
asserted [affirmatively] against the assignee under ... subsection (3)
...
shall not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time

of such assignment. ' 76 The successful claim or defense based upon
the failure of consideration will necessarily entail the cancellation
of the balance of the consumer credit obligation. The limitation of
the "amount owing to the assignee at the time of such assignment"
has application, therefore, with respect to the restitution to be demanded by the consumer upon rescission of the contract for the
lack or failure of consideration. 77 The difference between the amount
remaining to be owed on the obligation, which is a principal balance
(plus potentially accrued interest), and the amount owing to the
assignee at the time of the assignment of the obligation, which is
a principal balance (assuming the obligation is current), will be the
amount by which the consumer reduced the principal amount of the
obligation through payments to the assignee after the assignment of
the consumer's obligation.
The "amount owing at the time of assignment" becomes a limitation, therefore, because it does not permit a claim for restitution
of the interest paid to the assignee. Equity is served by such a result
because the failure of consideration is based upon an excuse for
nonperformance of a contract resulting from an intervening event
75. See Laurie v. Thomas, 294 S.E.2d 78 (V. Va. 1982); Frasher v. Frasher, 249 S.E.2d 513,

517 (W. Va. 1978) ("Since rescission or cancellation of a deed is an equitable remedy, failure of
consideration need not be the only basis on which relief may be granted.").
76. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(I) (Supp. 1991).

77. Technically, if a lack of consideration existed, then no contract was ever formed because
consideration is a necessary requisite of a contract. See Lightner v. Lightner, 124 S.E.2d 355 (W.
Va. 1962). Accordingly, no contract can be rescinded. Nonetheless, the customer may demand restitution of the amounts paid for a nonexistent bargain, so no distinction will be made between the
"lack" or the "failure" of consideration in this discussion.
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over which the parties had no control. 78 The assignee's retention of
the interest payments is consistent with the requirement that, in a
rescission of a contract, the benefits conferred by each party to the
other be returned. 79 The assignee advanced funds which enabled the
completion of the intended, although subsequently thwarted, transaction and, therefore, retention of the interest payments is fair value
for the use of the lender's money before rescission.
A general rule regarding assignments is that only the claims or
defenses existing before or at the time of notice of the assignment
to the obligated party may be asserted against the rights of the seller
as held by the assignee. 80 Failure of consideration will generally arise
in the course of the contract performance, perhaps substantially after
the date on which the contract was executed and assigned. The general rule would preclude the obligated party's assertion of the defense because it was not one existing before the assignment. The
drafters of the Assignee Provision very adroitly solved this problem
of timing by providing: "Notwithstanding any provisions of this
section, an assignee shall be subject to any claim or defense based
upon lack or failure of consideration." 8 ' Although seemingly innocuous, the provision sustains the consumer's action for rescission
should the consideration for the consumer credit obligation fail after
the date of the seller's assignment of the consumer's credit obligation
to a lender.
3. Claims or Defenses Founded in Fraud
As with a claim or defense founded in the lack or failure of
consideration, the consumer has a right to seek affirmative relief
78. See id. at 360 ("[Flailure of consideration... means that something presumably of value

moving from the obligee to the obligor was intended, but did not materialize.") (citations omitted);
see also Rauschenbach v. McDaniel's Estate, 11 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 1940).
79. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has opined:

The rule that he who seeks equity must do equity requires that "any person demanding
the rescission of a contract to which he is a party must restore or offer to restore to the
other party whateverhe may have received under the contract in the way of money, property,
or other consideration or benefit."
National Life Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 7 S.E.2d 52, 54 (W.Va. 1940) (quoting HERnY C. BLAcK, BLAcK
ON RsCISSION AND CANcmMAbON § 617, at 1485 (Jay Lee ed., 2d ed., Vernon Law Book Co. 1929)).
80. "The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor which accrues
before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but not to defenses and claims which accrue
thereafter ...." REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF CoNrAcTS § 336(2) (1979).
81. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(4) (Supp. 1991).
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from the lender, as assignee, based upon a claim founded in fraud.
The limitation on affirmative relief to the "amount owing to the
assignee at the time of assignment" (previously discussed with respect to claims or defenses based on a lack or failure of consideration) has an exception for the "claim or defense founded in
fraud." 82 The reason for the exception is that, for fraud, a complete
rescission should be available to the consumer, including a return
of the paid interest, because, unlike the instance of a lack or failure
of consideration, the transaction into which the consumer entered
never bore any relation to the transaction as represented by the
seller. Equity compels that the consumer be made completely whole.
Before 1990, however, no express limitation was set forth in the
Assignee Provision on the amount of the claims or defenses founded
in fraud which could be asserted against the assignee. The lack of
such a limitation gave rise to the previously mentioned perception
that the assignee was liable for all damages, including punitive damages, incurred by a consumer as a result of the fraud of a seller
with whom the consumer dealt. In the context of the Assignee Provision, however, this perception was unfounded for several reasons.
First, as previously discussed, the language of the operative provision of the statute is quite precise. The declaration that the assignee
shall "take and hold" the assigned obligation "subject to" the consumer's claims and defenses against the seller focuses any claim or
defense, without exception, on the four corners of the writing evidencing the obligation. The affirmative relief sought by the consumer is limited, necessarily, by the amount of the assigned
obligation.
Second, the reference to "claims or defenses" negates any such
argument. A reference to "claims" in the Assignee Provision is never
82. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(1) (Supp. 1991). Excess penalties and charges imposed by the
provisions of W. VA. CODE § 46A-5-101 (1986) are also an exception to the limitation of the amount
which the consumer may assert against the assignee. Id. As previously discussed, the provisions of
section 5-101 of the vest Virginia Act govern the actions of creditors. The exception for the charges
and penalties is simply to ensure that no argument can be made that the penalties or charges are

limited, in any way, by the limitations set forth in the Assignee Provision with respect to the actions
of the assignee as a creditor of the consumer after taking assignment of the consumer's credit obligation.
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made without an accompanying reference to "defenses." This usage
is consistent with the common-law phrase "claims or defenses" relating to defenses to payment of an obligation or for set off of an
amount against an obligation. In the common-law phrase, "claims"
meant counterclaims necessary to establish the amount of any set
off.
The drafters of the Assignee Provision were very much aware
of the symbiotic nature of the terms "claims" and "defenses." In
another section of the provision, the drafters made reference to a
consumer's "right of action, claim or defense." 8 3 If the exception
for "claims or defenses founded in fraud" was truly an imprimatur
of affirmative actions against the assignee for the recovery of damages, the usage of "claims or defenses" rather than, or in addition
to, "claims for relief" or "rights of action," seems unlikely due to
the drafters' express distinction among these terms in other sections
of the Assignee Provision.
Third, the reference to "claims or defenses founded in fraud"
is, but for the exception to the limitation of the amount, coupled
at all times with the reference to "lack or failure of consideration."
As no affirmative action at law exists for the lack or failure of
consideration and the only relief, at all, is equitable, consistency
compels the conclusion that the relief intended for claims or defenses
founded in fraud is also solely equitable. 84
Fourth, fraud is not a cause of action or a claim for relief.
Rather, fraud is a finding of fact that an intended, material, false
representation has been made. If fraud induced a contract, the defrauded party can "affirm the contract and bring his action at law
for damages for the deceit." 85 Alternatively, the party may assert
86
the fraud by disaffirming the contract and suing for rescission.
83. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(5) (Supp. 1991).

84. Laurie v. Thomas, 294 S.E.2d 78, 80 (W. Va. 1978) ("The main thrust of the complaint
was to have the deed rescinded based upon a claim of fraud, duress, coercion, undue influence and
a lack of adequate consideration. This type of claim is traditionally equitable.").
85. Crockett v. Burleson, 54 S.E. 341 (W. Va. 1906); see also Zogg v. Hedges, 29 S.E.2d 871
(W. Va. 1944) ("Ordinarily, the remedy for false representation or fraud is by an action at law for
fraud and deceit.").
86. See Crockett, 54 S.E.2d 341.
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Because the Assignee Provision is focused expressly on the assigned
obligation, the only relief based on fraud which is consistent with
the Provision's focus is the equitable relief providing for the disaffirmance of the assigned obligation and the suit for rescission.
Fifth, the Assignee Provision insulates the assignee expressly from
liability for claims arising out "of personal injury" or "damage to
property." A cause of action for damages arising out of fraud requires the showing of some injury which will necessarily be to the
person or a property interest of the person. Accordingly, no claim
can be made for such injury. Fraud only then serves as a basis for
relief other than the recovery of damages, i.e., rescission and the
attending requirement of restitution.8 7
Sixth, the imposition of strict liability upon the assignee for damages arising from the acts of a third party would violate the substantive due process rights of the assignee. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, when confronted with the imposition of strict
liability upon an employer for an employee's injuries, opined:
Conceding, as we do, that the state has the right, through workmen's compensation legislation, to require the creation of a fund, and to administer the same
for the benefit of those injured in industry, we do not think the legislature, under
our Constitution, can arbitrarily impose liability [for an employee's injury], enforceable in an action at law, upon an employer, in the absence of a showing
of wrongdoing, neglect or default on his part, proximately contributing thereto.
We do not think the police power of the state can be extended to sustain such
an enactment."

Consistently, the West Virginia Act can preserve the equities among
the parties to the transaction, but the West Virginia Act cannot
impose strict liability upon the assignee merely because of its status
as an assignee.
Seventh, the application of the Assignee Provision to permit recovery from the assignee of all damages suffered by the consumer
87. The reason that the breach of a seller's warranty might be assertable against an assignee
even though the cause of action typically represents the recovery of damages to the buyer's property
interests is that the seller's breach of warranty has been treated historically as a defense to the buyer's
contractual obligation or the basis for restitution of amounts paid by the buyer upon the belief that
the seller would fulfill his or her promises subsequently. See supra note 67.
88. Prager v. W.H. Chapman & Sons Co., 9 S.E.2d 880, 883 (W. Va. 1940) (emphasis added).
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as a result of the seller's fraud runs afoul of federal provisions. In
1975, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) determined that, in light
of the absence of statutes in the majority of states protecting consumers in the assignment of credit obligations, it should engage in
ad hoc law making.89 Under the guise of its rule-making authority,

the FTC declared that the seller 9° committed an unfair or deceptive
practice if a notice in at least ten point, bold face type was not
included in any consumer credit contract which the seller took or
received in a transaction. 91 The required notice was:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT
HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER
BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
2
HEREUNDER.-

Because the FTC had no jurisdiction over lenders, this provision
was necessarily directed to sellers. By requiring a seller to put the
notice in a contract between the seller and the consumer, the assignee
took the contract subject to an express contract term eliminating
the assignee's protection under the holder in due course doctrine
and, due to the notice's prominence in the contract, eliminating the
assignee's protection under any fine print waiving the consumer's
claims and defenses.
As one federal court noted, "This [federal] regulation was specifically intended, according to the FTC to provide that 'a consumer
can ... maintain an affirmative action against a creditor who has

89. "In one stroke of their pen the clever rascals at the FTC did what Congress would have
feared to do, what the courts could do only piecemeal and over decades, and what state legislatures
had refused to do." Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder
In Due Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 953 n.1 (quoting JAmxs J. WHrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFoRm Co

RCIAL CODE § 14-

8, at 639 (3d. ed. 1988)). Hereinafter the Federal Trade Commission shall be referred to as the "FTC."
90. "Seller" is defined as "a person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells or leases
goods or services to consumers." 16 C.F.R. § 433.10) (1991).
91. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1991). The FTC also required that the seller not accept the proceeds
of any loan made for the purpose of acquiring the seller's goods or services if the loan agreement
did not contain the required notice. The seller would typically have notice of the purpose of the loan
to the consumer for reason that the loan proceeds check is made payable to the seller in most instances.
92. Id.
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received payments for a return of monies paid on account."' 93 The
federal court further observed, "as noted by the FTC, an affirmative
action against a creditor 'will only be available where a seller's breach
is so substantial that a court is persuaded that rescission and restitution are justified.' ' 94 Thus, the FTC's required language, if included in a contract, expressly limits the recovery of a consumer
from an assignee to the amounts paid under the contract and permits
only such a recovery when the circumstances warrant rescission and
restitution.
The FTC notice, interestingly, would not supplant the Assignee
Provision, because the FTC concedes that "one must look to state
law and the terms of the contract to determine the 'manner and
procedure' by which a consumer may affirmatively maintain an action against the creditor." 95 The interpretation of the Assignee Provision's reference to claims founded in fraud as merely permitting
an affirmative action for the equitable relief of rescission and restitution coincides precisely with the intent of the FTC regulation and
complements comfortably the manner and procedure by which the
consumer can present his or her claims. 96 If the Assignee Provision
was otherwise interpreted to permit the affirmative recovery of damages from the assignee in excess of the amount of the assigned obligation, the statute would be in conflict with the express limitation
set forth in the FTC's required notice.
Finally, if the imposition of liability upon an assignee for all the
damages suffered by a consumer in a sales transaction was intended
by the drafters of the Assignee Provision, then the West Virginia
Act has substantially departed from its heritage as expressly declared

93. Eachen v. Scott Hous. Sys., 630 F. Supp. 162, 164- (M.D. Ala. 1986) (quoting 40 Fed.
Reg. 53506, 53524 (1975)).
94. Id. at 165 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53524 (1975)).
95. Id.
96. The question arises as to whether the Assignee Provision is rendered superfluous by the
FTC's regulation. The answer is no because (i) the FTC's notice, if not included in the contract,
results in a violation by the seller, not the holder of the contract, and, accordingly, the Assignee
Provision would provide the protection of the consumer in the absence of the FTC's notice; and (ii)
the Assignee Provision is a more precise application of the principles advocated by the FTC and, in
the absence of the state provision, the courts would have to determine how to implement the provisions
of the sparsely worded FTC notice.
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by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, i.e., the UCCC,
the NCA, and existing law. The UCCC imposes a limitation on "all
claims and defenses" of an amount that does not "exceed the amount
owing to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted
against the assignee." 97 This limitation is merely the practical application of the UCCC's restriction that "rights of a buyer or lessee
under this section can only be asserted as a matter of defense to
or set-off against a claim by the assignee.' '98 As previously discussed,
these limitations mirror the Common-Law Rule governing the assignment of obligations. For claims or defenses founded on grounds
other than fraud or lack or failure of consideration, the Assignee
Provision's limitation is identical.
The NCA, however, which was "advocated by a small but vocal
minority of self-appointed consumer activists ... [who] vigorously

attacked the provisions" of the UCCC, imposed a limitation of the
amount of the "transaction total" for all claims and defenses of
the consumer. 99 The section containing the limitation was described
as rendering "ineffective and unenforceable agreements of consumers in form contracts which waive their defenses against assignees"
so that the "subterfuge used even when the holder in due course
does not apply is not permitted at all." 100 Despite the stridency of
the NCA's drafters, they still honored a limitation tied to the four
corners of the assigned instrument, contract, or other writing.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals perceived the West
Virginia Act as built upon the model acts or existing law and not
as creating new principles of law. 101 Accordingly, the Assignee Provision should be interpreted consistently with the model acts and
existing law. A consistent interpretation is that the West Virginia
Legislature saw fit to impose three differing standards for the consumer's relief against the assignee depending upon the nature of the
claim or defense held by the consumer.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

U.C.C.C. § 2.404 (1974).
Id.
Moo, supra note 42, at 441.
NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 2.406 commentary (First Final Draft 1970).
Clendenin Lumber & Supply Co. v. Carpenter, 305 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1983).
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First, for the consumer's basic claims or defenses, the West Virginia Act honors the Common-Law Rule and the UCCC Rule lim-

itation on claims and defenses assertable against an assignee which
is the amount remaining to be owed on the contract. Moreover, the
consumer has only the right to assert a defense to, or a set off
against, a claim if brought in an action commenced by the assignee,
except that the customer does have the right to the cancellation of
any remaining debt in the consumer's own affirmative action against
the assignee.

Second, for a claim or defense based on a lack or failure of
consideration, the Act honors the common-law right of the consumer
to rescind the transaction and demand restitution, but the Act permits the assignee to retain the interest paid on the obligation.

Third, for a claim or defense based on a fraud, the Act honors
the NCA Rule and the common law by preserving the consumer's
right to a complete rescission of the assigned obligation and permitting the consumer's full restitution from the assignee.1t 2 This is
102. By this point, a lender might have determined that it should simply make direct loans to
a dealer's customers. This is not an original thought. Before the drafting of the model acts, lenders
had attempted to cut off the consumer's defenses by orchestrating the transaction as a direct loan.
Notably,, "the term 'dragging the body' was coined to refer to some sellers' practice of taking the
consumer to the lender's office." Lawrence & Minan, supra note 30, at 329. The West Virginia Act
includes a provision that provides a direct loan is made subject to the consumer's claims or defenses
if the "lender participates in or is connected with the sales transaction." W. VA. CoDE § 46A-2-103
(Supp. 1991). The lender is "considered to be connected with the sales transaction" if:
(i) The lender and the seller have arranged for a commission or brokerage or referral fee
for the extension of credit by the lender; (ii) The lender is a person related to the seller
unless the relationship is remote or is not a factor in the transaction; (iii) The seller guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the risk of loss by the lender upon the loan other
than a risk of loss arising solely from the seller's failure to perfect a lien securing the loan;
(iv) The lender directly supplies the seller with the documents used by the borrower to
evidence the transaction or the seller directly supplies the lender with documents used by
the borrower to evidence the transaction; (v) The loan is conditioned upon the borrower's
purchase of the goods or services from the particular seller, but the lender's payment of
proceeds of the loan to the seller does not in itself establish that the loan was so conditioned;
[or] (vi) The seller in such sale has specifically recommended such lender by name to the
borrower and the lender has made ten or more loans to borrowers within a period of twelve
months within which period the loan in question was made, the proceeds of which other
ten or more loans were used in consumer credit sales with the seller or a person related
to the seller, if in connection with such other ten or more loans, the seller also specifically
recommended such lender by name to the borrowers involved ....
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-103(a)(2) (Supp. 1991). In such an instance, the analysis of the Assignee
Provision would be relevant to understanding the liability of the lender.
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the unique blend of the provisions of the Common-Law Rule, the
UCCC Rule, and the NCA Rule which truly attests to the Act's,
in the words of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, "hybrid" nature.
In the 1990 legislative session, an express limitation was added
to the Assignee Provision on the amount of the claims or defenses
founded in fraud able to be asserted against the assignee. The following clause was added to the provisions of Section 2-102 of the
Act: "Provided, That as to any claim or defense founded in fraud
arising on or after the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred
ninety, the total sought shall not exceed the amount of the original
obligation under this instrument, contract or other writing." The
intent of the proponents of the legislation was to merely confirm
the status and meaning of the existing law and to "clear up" any
perception that the Assignee Provision provided for personal liability
of assignees in consumer credit transactions beyond the assigned
obligation.103 The amendment passed without debate or outcry legislative silence which supports the assertion that the amendment
was not a dramatic shift in the policy respecting assignee liability.
The effective date of July 1, 1990, was not in the legislation as
introduced, but was inserted by a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee so that the amendment did not affect or interfere with
existing claims under the Assignee Provision. Admittedly, the inclusion of an effective date opened the door for an argument that
some change was intended and, therefore, assignees must have had
a greater exposure for claims and defenses founded in fraud than
the amount set forth in the amendment. However, the preceding
discussion negates this argument.'0 4

103. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(l) (Supp. 1991). The legislation was proposed by the West
Virginia Bankers' Association. The author of this Article and the general counsel for One Valley
Bancorp of West Virginia, Inc. assisted the Senate Judiciary Committee in revising the proposed
language of the amendment. The amendment eliminated also certain transitional provisions of the
Assignee Provision.
104. For two reasons the argument that the amendment changed existing law should not be
advanced. First, by reason of oversight, the amendment was not made to the provisions of W. VA.
CODE § 46A-2-101 (1986) governing holders in due course who take assignment of a negotiable instrument without knowledge of the consumer nature of the obligation. The provision provides for
the same limitations as the Assignee Provision before 1990 including the absence of an express lim-
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The Limitation of Actions Restriction

The Assignee Provision provides that, for affirmative actions in
Which claims or defenses founded in fraud or lack or failure of
consideration are asserted against the assignee, the consumer's assertion of the claims or defenses are subject to the provisions of
the Code relating to limitation of actions.105 The restriction belies
the argument that the West Virginia Act merely preserves the consumer's claims for equitable relief, because the statutes governing
the limitation of actions apply only to actions at law.1°6 However,
the doctrine of laches applies to such equitable claims and the most
analogous limitation of action is relevant to determining whether,
in most circumstances, laches should be found.' ° The assignee has,
therefore, the benefit of the equitable defense of laches in any affirmative action permitted to be brought by the consumer under the
Assignee Provision.
D.

The Preservation of Right of Action, Claim, or Defense

Finally, with respect to the consumer's claims and defenses against
the seller, the Assignee Provision stipulates: "Nothing contained in
this section shall be construed as affecting any buyer's.., right of
action, claim or defense which is otherwise provided for in this code
or at common law."'0 8 While this provision has yet to be interpreted
itation on the amount of the claims and defenses founded on fraud which can be asserted against
the assignee. Without the amendment, if the argument were to prevail that all damages were recoverable from an assignee, then it must follow that the same recovery could be had from a holder who
may be five parties removed from the original transaction. No such result was intended nor could
such a result be tolerated.
Secondly, the language may, inadvertently, reduce the amount which a consumer could recover
under the Assignee Provision under the construction of the provision advocated by the author before
its amendment. Although the amendment was not intended to change existing law, the reference to
the "original obligation" may be construed as a reference to the principal amount solely. The better
and intended construction is that the language means something more than the amount owing at the
time of assignment which applies to claims and defenses founded in lack or failure of consideration.
The term "obligation" should be construed to include any obligation to pay actually accrued interest
on the principal amount of the obligation so that the consumer may recover any interest paid to the
assignee in instances of a seller's fraud.
105. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(3) (Supp. 1991).
106. Calacino v. McCutcheon, 356 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1987).
107. Id.
108. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-102(5) (Supp. 1991).
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by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, one explanation
for the provision is that it permits the consumer to maintain an
action against the assignee, presumably a lender, on other theories
of a lender's liability. Such an interpretation would, however, lead
to completely absurd results. If the assignee sues the lender claiming
the seller was merely an instrumentality of the lender, then the assignee provisions would not apply because the lender could not be
an assignee of its own rights.
Similarly, if the lender is claimed to be a joint venturer with the
seller, then the consumer's attempt to base a claim both upon a
joint venture and a contract of assignment would necessarily fail,
because the joint venture is an agreement to share profits that is
fundamentally inconsistent with an agreement in a contract of assignment to an arm's length transfer to an assignee, for valuable
consideration, of all the seller's rights to, and interests in, a consumer's credit obligation. For the same reason, the lender could not
be engaged in both a conspiracy requiring an illicit agreement and
a legitimate transfer of rights pursuant to a contract of assignment.
Moreover, the necessity to elect remedies precludes such inconsistent claims. The assertion of claims for damages precludes the
assertion of equitable relief under the West Virginia Act for the
basic reason that, if an adequate remedy at law exists and damages
fairly compensate the injury, equity is not invoked. 1 9
The second, and most compelling, explanation is that the section
is intended merely to preserve the consumer's claims against the
seller. Accordingly, the consumer may sue the assignee to relieve
itself of the consumer credit obligation, but the consumer may sue
also the seller for the damages occasioned by the seller's conduct.
The consumer may have damages from a breach of warranty that
exceed the amount that remains on the credit obligation for purposes
of a setoff, and, therefore, the consumer may sue the seller for
compensation of this amount. The rescission of the contract would
necessarily preclude the suit against the seller for breach of con109. See Berisford v. Lynch, 126 S.E. 492 (W. Va. 1925); Big Huff Coal Co. v. Thomas, 85
S.E. 171 (W. Va. 1915); Gall v. Tygart's Valley Bank, 40 S.E. 390 (W. Va. 1901).
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tractual provisions. However, if the rescission were based upon the
fraud of the seller, then the consumer could sue the seller for recovery based upon the tort of fraud and deceit. 110
This provision should not be interpreted to permit multiple recoveries. Instead, the seller should be able to reduce the consumer's
damages by any loss abated by the rescission and restitution of the
contract in the hands of the assignee. Otherwise, an assignee who
has incurred a loss under the Assignee Provision would be unable
to seek contribution or indemnity from a seller because the seller
could defend the assignee's claim on the ground that its liability to
the consumer was not extinguished by the assignee's payment.
V.

THE PoLicY UNDERLYIN.

THE

AsSIGNEE PROVISION AND

LENDER LLnxrIY

The advent of the Assignee Provision was not heralded by the
trumpeting of archangels. The Assignee Provision's revitalization of
the Common-Law Rule was not seen as the conquering of the darkest
evil. Even as acerbic as the commentary of the NCA was, no hue
and cry was heard for the cessation of consumer credit. In fact, the
preservation of consumer credit was an express goal of the UCCC's
drafters for fear that the consumer would resort to unscrupulous
sources of credit.'11 Also, small or new businesses can be competitive, typically, only with the assistance of lending institutions and,
therefore, the continued competitiveness of the consumer industry
would be direly affected by the cessation of indirect lending.11 2 The
death knell was simply not sounded for "indirect lending" with the
passage of the West Virginia Act and the Assignee Provision.
The decision to reinstate the rule that the assignee holds the
consumer's contract subject to the consumer's claims and defenses
110. This discussion may be merely academic. The recourse against the assignee is not typically
necessary unless the seller is insolvent or has moved. Accordingly, recourse against the seller may be
a futile exercise.
11. "As stated in the prefatory note, the Special Committee of the Conference recognized that
...too much enhancement of debtors' rights or remedies, might deprive the less credit-worthy of
lawful sources of credit and drive them to 'loan sharks' and other illegal credit grantors." Moo,
supra note 42, at 44243.
112. Id. at 450.
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against the seller was merely a matter of economic reality. A consumer does not have the resources, typically, to investigate a product
and does not have the wherewithal, generally, to bear the financial
loss in a transaction. A seller's dependence upon a lender's involvement in a consumer transaction provides an opportunity for policymakers, through the lender, to influence the seller's activities, while
the competition among lenders for consumer credit obligations is
such that a modest adjustment in the consumer credit triangle will
not result in the abandonment of the business of "indirect lending." 1 3 With the Assignee Provision, therefore, the legislature has
simply shifted the loss arising from a dealer's activities to the lender
in the consumer credit triangle, rather than leaving the loss on the
shoulders of the consumer.
By forcing lenders to bear the risk of loss in consumer credit
transactions due to the sellers' actions as well as the consumers'
default, prudent lenders will attempt to ensure that they are dealing
with reputable sellers engaged in responsible business practices. 114
Lenders have the means, as well as the incentive, to investigate the
practices of dealers with whom they do business and to monitor the

113. Of course, the amount of the potential loss must be definite; otherwise fimancial institutions
will restrict consumer credit severely if the risk cannot be adequately assessed.
114. Lending institutions have been viewed frequently as a tool with which public policy can be
shaped. In 1968, a California court determined that the state's problems with tract housing could be
solved by the imposition of liability upon a lender to a builder of tract housing, opining:
If existing sanctions are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective financial
control of tract building will insure responsible building practices [because] the residential
construction industry is composed principally of small builders, most of whom have so little
equity that they must borrow money in order to finance the production of new homes.
Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609, 619 (Cal, 1968) (overruled by statute). Twentytwo years later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was of the opinion that a lender should be
held responsible for the environmental contamination caused by a borrower's inadequate hazardous
waste policy, declaring:
Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste
treatment systems and policies of potential debtors. If the treatment systems seem inadequate, the risk of CERCLA liability will be weighed into the terms of the loan agreement.
Creditors, therefore, will incur no greater risk than they bargained for and debtors, aware
that inadequate hazardous waste treatment systems will have a significant adverse impact
on their loan terms, will have powerful incentives to improve their handling of hazardous
wastes.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
752 (1991).
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business activities of these dealers. 115 Dealers who are found to be

unscrupulous or who have an inordinate amount of consumer complaints made against them will be unable to find lenders with whom
to do business, and, therefore, will be forced to cease doing business
or, at least, to curtail their unscrupulous practices." 6
Unfortunately, this policy decision was made before lender liability came into vogue. With the advent of lender liability predicated upon theories of joint venture, breaches of duties of care to
third parties, and instrumentality, the actions of a lender in adequately assessing its risk as an assignee of a dealer's consumer credit
sale creates a potential paradox: the carrying out of a policy advanced by the lawmakers of this state while undertaking actions
which might support a prima facie case of lender liability under
various theories.

115. One author has advocated that the risk of loss be placed not on either the innocent consumer
or the innocent lender, but, rather, on the seller:
Neither the UCCC or the NCA have offered a proposal which protects both the creditor
and the consumer, but it is submitted that the protection of both is possible. By placing
the risk of loss upon the party who gave rise to the consumer's claim or defense the seller
of the consumer goods through the requirement of a bond to hold the consumer harmless,
the "free flow of credit" can be essentially preserved.
Tobler, supra note 36, at 593. The author's proposition, however, required a state agency to be
responsible for the bonding and to be a necessary party to any action. The additional costs to the
state would require a tax either upon the consumer or the lender and, therefore, the interests of
neither would not, in the final analysis, be served. Technically, the same result could be obtained by
refusing permits of business without adequate capital which, of course, means the possible extinction
of the small business entity.
116. A potential argument against an assignee bearing the risk of loss is that consumers who
paid for the product in full at the inception of the transaction have no recourse against the lender.
Conceivably, one might argue that such a policy encourages credit transactions at a time when a debt
ridden nation needs to build its capital through savings. However, cash purchasers do benefit, indirectly, from the Assignee Provision by the fact that, if the policy of the rule is fully served, dealers
who cannot fulfill their promises will not be able to do business and, therefore, the cash transaction
will not take place. Moreover, the advice to borrow rather than spend is unwise since in most instances
the assertion of claims and defenses against the assignee will involve annoyance and inconvenience
for all parties, potential credit difficulties for the consumer in the future, and the attendant costs of
litigation. Accordingly, the policy is probably neutral in its effect upon consumer spending habits.
However, the fact that consumers who paid for the product in full at the inception of the
transaction have no recourse against the lender is an argument in support of expressly limiting the
consumer's recovery against the assignee within the boundaries of the transaction. If consumers can
be enriched by punitive damages against a lender merely as an assignee, then no consumer should
ever pay cash. Obviously, this result cannot be tolerated, and, therefore, the limits of the assignee's
liability are necessarily defined by the amount of the assigned obligation.
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For example, the lender is encouraged to investigate the dealer
and, conceivably, the dealer's product by reason of the risk of loss
imposed by the Assignee Provision. This investigation will be done
solely for the economic protection of the lender's interests or, more
specifically, the interests of the lender's depositors and shareholders.
However, a claim might be made by a customer of the seller that
the investigation was performed negligently, and thus the lender
117
breached a duty owed to the customer.
Moreover, the imposition of liability upon the lender gives the
lender a reason and, in fact, a compulsion, to encourage the seller
to resolve a consumer's complaint or, in the absence of the seller's
ability to do so, a reason to undertake itself the correction of the
buyer's problem. Yet, under these circumstances, a claim might be
made that the seller and the assignee are engaged in a joint venture
based upon the lender's actions in resolving, practically, the consumer's complaint. 118
Finally, if the lender monitors the seller's activities to ensure that
the seller is keeping its promises and is not engaged in conduct giving
rise to a substantial number of complaints, a claim might arise from
the apparent involvement of the lender in the seller's business that
the seller was merely an agent for the lender or that the seller was
a mere instrumentality of the lender.

117. These claims were often made by the purchasers of homes who felt the lender had negligently
supervised the construction of the home. The majority of courts have denied such claims. E.g., Annetta

v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1978). In Armetta, the court ruled:
The only supervisory provisions in the loan agreement were inserted for the protection of

the lender, as a lender, not as a participant in the development .... Even when a lender
is in privity with a purchaser, provisions in the mortgage for inspection by the lender of
the project do not give rise to a duty by the lender to the purchaser-mortgagor to see that
the project is properly constructed.
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
118. The author was involved, personally, in a case where a seller had ceased doing business.
When a customer complained that the product she had purchased was broken, the client, a financial

institution, hired a person to make repairs. In a subsequent suit, the fact of the repair was offered
as proof that the financial institution was engaged in a joint venture, or was in control of the seller,
because, as opposing counsel noted satirically, "when did you ever see a bank come out and change

the transmission in your car?." This action was entirely consistent with the Assignee Provision, however, because the bank shouldered, arguably, the loss arising from the seller's breach of a warranty

of service or repair made at the transaction's inception.
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Given these illustrations, it is obvious that if statutory policy
mandates that the lender bear the risk of loss in a transaction with
a dealer - thereby encouraging lenders to make such assessments
or take such actions to avoid liability - then the lender should not
be permitted to be sued for the very behavior which was compelled
by the statute. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted
a similar paradox when it decreed: "It cannot be that one can be
liable to a private party under a state's tort law for doing exactly
that which the state government itself has instructed him to do and
threatened him a penalty for not doing."' 1 9 Accordingly, the statute
should be amended by adding a "safe harbor" clause which provides
that any reasonable actions taken by a lender to assess its risk of
loss with respect to an assigned consumer credit obligation should
not be offered as a basis for liability to the consumers except under
the provisions of the Assignee Provision.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Assignee Provision allocates the risk of loss in a consumer
credit transaction arising from the acts of the seller to the lender,
as assignee, rather than to the consumer. The Assignee Provision
accomplishes this allocation by preserving the consumer's claims or
defenses against the seller in actions by or against an assignee. The
claims and defenses which may be asserted against an assignee are
limited in total by the amount involved in the transaction. However,
thq Assignee Provision should be amended so that steps taken by
a lender to fulfill the policy underlying the statute do not serve as
a basis for allegations of the lender's liability to the consumer other
than pursuant to the dictates of the Assignee Provision.

119. Shrewsbury v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 395 S.E.2d 745, 746 (%V.Va. 1990).
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